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Joe Friggieri1
Lessons from Aquinas in Amoris Laetitia
It may have escaped the notice of some readers of Pope Francis’ Exhortation Amoris Laetitia that the first quoted reference in Chapter One, after Genesis, 
Revelation and Matthew, is to Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986), the Argentinian 
short-story writer, essayist, poet and translator, considered by critics as arguably 
“the most important figure in Spanish- language literature since Cervantes.”2 
Francis calls him “the poet” and quotes from “Calle Desconocida,” “The 
Unknown Path,” a poem from Borges’ first collection of poetry, Fervor de Buenos 
Aires, published in 1923.
The beautiful image quoted by Francis, “every home is like a lampstand,” 
comes at the end of a long sentence starting with Jesus’ description of the two 
houses, one built on rock and the other on sand, which, in the Pope’s words, 
“symbolises any number of family situations shaped by the exercise of their 
members’ freedom.” This is not the usual interpretation put on the Gospel simile 
(Mt 7:24-27), but Francis links it to the Exhortation’s opening remark that “The 
Bible is full of families, births, love stories and family crises,” right from the 
appearance of Adam and Eve’s family, “with all its burdens of violence and also 
its enduring strength” (§8). 
Using the first six lines of Psalm 128 as a stepping stone, the Exhortation invites 
us to “cross the threshold of a tranquil home, with the family sitting around the 
festive table,” with the father and mother at the centre, “a couple with their own 
personal story of love,” and children at their side “like olive shoots” (§9).
This “idyllic picture” of a harmonious household contrasts sharply with “the 
presence of pain, evil and violence that break up families and their communion 
 1 Joe Friggieri is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Malta. His areas of specialization 
are Philosophy of Language, Action and Aesthetics. He is well-known for his cultural programmes 
on radio and television and is a regular contributor to social and political debate. 
 2 Noah Wardrip Fruin, Nick Montfort eds. The New Media Reader (Cambridge Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2003), 29.
MELITA THEOLOGICA
Journal of the Faculty of Theology
University of Malta
67/2 (2017): 181-190
182 MELITA THEOLOGICA
of life and love - a sombre dimension already present at the beginning, when 
through sin, the relationship of love and purity before man and woman turns 
into domination” (§19). “This thread of suffering and bloodshed,” the author 
reminds us, runs through the pages of the Bible, starting with Cain’s murder of 
his brother Abel and “the tragedies and violence marking the family of David,” 
from which Jesus was descended, right down to the massacre of the Innocents 
by Herod and his henchmen after the birth of the Messiah, on account of which 
Jesus and his family “had to flee to a foreign land” (§§ 20-21). Herod may be seen 
as the prototype of a vast array of ruthless dictators who have marked the course 
of history. Francis mentions him again at the end of Chapter One as the despotic 
ruler whose “implacable violence” brought suffering “and even nightmares” to the 
Family of Nazareth (§30). Borges, incidentally, was a sworn enemy of dictatorial 
regimes and a fearless critic of all kinds of totalitarian systems, from Nazism and 
Communism to Fascism and Peronism. “Dictatorships,” he once wrote, “breed 
oppression, servility, cruelty. More loathsome still is the fact that they breed 
idiocy, mere discipline usurping the place of clear thinking.”3 The impossibility, 
moreover, of separating original sin from grace in the history of the human race 
and the life of its members is one of the themes pursued by Borges in his short 
stories.
Among the factors causing pain and disruption in modern families, the 
Exhortation mentions unemployment, poverty, hunger (§25), social degradation 
resulting from brutal exploitation of the earth’s resources (§26), the lack of 
dignified or affordable housing, inadequate health care, long working hours and 
badly paid jobs (§44), war, terrorism and organised crime (§45).
A long paragraph talks about migration and its negative effects on family life. 
It quotes at length from the Synod’s final report (2015, 23), noting that “forced 
migration of families, resulting from situations of war, persecutions, poverty 
and injustice, and marked by the vicissitudes of a journey that puts lives at risk, 
traumatizes people and destabilizes families,” often forcing those who migrate to 
leave family members behind (§46).
The Exhortation mentions drug abuse (“one of the scourges of our time”), 
alcoholism, gambling and other addictions as “causing immense suffering and 
the breakup of many families” (§51). It also refers to domestic violence and “the 
shameful ill-treatment to which women are sometimes subjected” as “craven acts 
of cowardice” on the part of men.
 3 From a speech written by Borges for the Argentinian Society of Writers (SADE), in Edwin 
Williamson, Borges: A Life (New York: Viking, 2004), 295.
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All this is a far cry from the kind of idyllic picture of the “tranquil festive 
table” described at the beginning of Chapter One. In the introduction to the 
Exhortation, Francis expresses his gratitude to the many contributions made 
by the Synod Fathers which helped him “to appreciate more fully the problems 
faced by families throughout the world” (§4) and to deal with them honestly, 
realistically and creatively. “The complexity of the issues that arose,” Francis 
observes, “revealed the need for continued open discussion of a number of 
doctrinal, moral, spiritual, and pastoral questions” (§2). Two attitudes needed 
to be avoided for greater clarity to be achieved in such matters: “an immoderate 
desire for total change without sufficient reflection or grounding” on the one 
hand, and “an attitude that would solve everything by applying general rules or 
deriving undue conclusions from particular theological considerations” on the 
other (§2). In the chapters following the introduction, Francis shows by example 
how one can avoid the second pitfall not by rejecting change but by grounding it 
in sound philosophical and theological reflection.
Amoris Laetitia uses a number of sources to deal with the questions it raises, 
including the Scriptures, the two Synod reports, especially the final report of 
the Second Synod (2015), as well as previous Papal documents and the author’s 
own catechetical instructions. But it also makes frequent use of Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (henceforth ST), and it is with those passages in the 
Exhortation that refer to Aquinas that this essay is (mainly) concerned.
Just as Borges appears at the beginning of Chapter One of the Exhortation, the 
first reference to Aquinas (Chapter Four, §99) follows a quote from another Latin 
American writer, the Mexican poet and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature 
Octavio Paz (1914-1988). Francis is commenting on the word “aschemonei,” 
which picks out one of the qualities of love mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor 13:4-7, a 
word that indicates that love is not rude, harsh or impolite, but gentle, thoughtful 
and pleasant. It is at this point that Francis quotes the Mexican poet’s definition 
of courtesy as “a school of sensitivity and disinterestedness” which requires a 
person “to develop his or her mind and feelings, learning how to listen, to speak 
and, at certain times, to keep quiet.”4 Francis adds that this is not something a 
Christian may choose to reject, but “an essential requirement of love,” and he 
supports this claim by quoting Thomas to the effect that “every human being is 
bound to live agreeably with those around him.”5 “Every day,” Francis continues, 
“entering into the life of another, even when that person already has a part to 
 4 Octavio Paz, La llama doble (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1993), 35. 
 5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (STh) II-II 114.2, ad 1.
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play in our life, demands the sensitivity and restraint which can renew trust and 
respect. Indeed, the deeper love is, the more it calls for respect for the other’s 
freedom and the ability to wait until the other opens the door to his or her heart” 
(§99).
Chapter Four, from which this passage is taken, reads like an exercise in virtue 
ethics, where the virtues listed by Paul constitute the main features or properties 
of love. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, virtues are acquired by habit and manifest 
themselves in action. This comes out clearly in the Exhortation’s discussion of 
generosity as another defining feature of love, where generously serving others is 
considered far more noble than loving oneself (§101). In Aquinas’ words, quoted 
in the text, “it is more proper to charity to desire to love than to desire to be 
loved,” 6 so much so that “mothers, who are those who love the most, seek to 
love more than to be loved.” 7 Willing the good of other persons for their sake, 
rather than to fulfil our own needs, is what Aquinas means by generosity. And 
the rationale of generosity is love.8
Following Aristotle, Aquinas describes conjugal love as “the greatest form of 
friendship.”9 The Exhortation elaborates: “It is a union possessing all the traits 
of a good friendship: concern for the good of the other, reciprocity, intimacy, 
warmth, stability and the resemblance born of a shared life” (§123). 
As one would expect given the title of the Exhortation, Amoris Laetitia talks 
at some length about the joy and beauty of love. Here again Aquinas is quoted in 
the body of the text. For him the word “joy” refers to an expansion of the heart.10 
It increases our pleasure and helps us find fulfilment in any number of things, 
even at those times of life when physical pleasure has ebbed (§126). Loving 
another person, then, involves appreciating their inner beauty and sacredness - 
“their great worth”11 - beyond their physical or psychological appeal, and without 
feeling the need to possess them (§126). 
Where feelings and desires are concerned, readers of the Exhortation are 
reminded that for Aquinas “experiencing an emotion is not, in itself, morally good 
or bad.”12 The stirring of desire or repugnance is neither sinful nor blameworthy. 
What is morally good or bad is what we do on the basis of, or under the influence 
 6 STh II-II 27.1, ad 2. 
 7 STh II-II 27.1.
 8 See John Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 311.
 9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 123; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8, 12.
 10 STh I-II 31.3, ad 3.
 11 STh I-II 26.3.
 12 STh I-II 24.1.
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of a given passion (§145). Marital life tries to ensure that one’s entire emotional 
life benefits the family as a whole. A family is mature when the emotional life of 
its members does not stifle their freedom but allows it to grow,13 “springs from it, 
enriches, perfects and harmonises it in the service of all” (§146). 
Training the emotions and instincts, the Exhortation goes on to say, is 
necessary and sometimes requires setting limits. It mentions two points made 
by Aquinas: first, that “excess, lack of control or obsession with a single form of 
pleasure can end up weakening and tainting that very pleasure”;14 and secondly, 
that controlling one’s emotions “does not mean renouncing moments of intense 
enjoyment,15 but rather integrating them with other moments of generous 
commitment, patient hope, inevitable weariness and struggle to achieve an 
ideal”(§148). 
Following the two central chapters on love (the fourth and the fifth), Chapter 
Six highlights some pastoral approaches that could lead to the formation of well-
functioning families, followed by Chapter Seven which deals with the raising 
and education of children. While Chapters One and Two described some of the 
factors of a political, social or economic nature (war, poverty, unemployment, 
lack of decent housing, forced migration etc) that led to the disruption of 
families, as it were “from the outside,” Chapter Eight deals in great detail with 
the internal causes responsible for the breakup of marriages and family life. 
Whereas in cases of the former type, the family members themselves can hardly 
be held responsible for the disruption, since they can do very little, or virtually 
nothing, to change the situation they find themselves in, in cases of the latter 
type some kind of moral assessment of the actions of the individual members 
of the family group may be appropriate. Once again, Thomas Aquinas plays an 
important role in providing useful guidelines for making such an assessment. (A 
caveat is necessary before we proceed. Cases of drug abuse, gambling, alcoholism 
and other addictions, as well as instances of domestic violence and the shameful 
treatment of women and children mentioned in Chapter Two, are obviously also 
subject to moral judgement.)
The importance of Chapter Eight is highlighted by Francis in the introduction, 
where he says that while married couples will be more concerned with Chapters 
Four and Five, and pastoral ministries with Chapter Six, “everyone should feel 
challenged by Chapter Eight,” which starts by quoting the Synod Fathers as 
exhorting the Church to “accompany with attention those who show signs of 
 13 STh I-II 59.5.
 14 STh I-II 32.7.
 15 STh II-II 153.2, ad 2.
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a wounded and troubled love, by restoring in them hope and confidence, like a 
beacon of a lighthouse in a port or a torch carried among the people to enlighten 
those who have lost their way, or who are in the middle of a storm.”16
In another simile Francis compares the task of the Church to “that of a field 
hospital” (§291). He insists that pastors need to enter into dialogue with those 
who live in situations which do not correspond to the Church’s teachings on 
marriage. Quoting from one of his own homilies, Francis says that he wants 
to reiterate something he “sought to make clear to the whole Church, lest we 
take the wrong path,” namely, that “there are two ways of thinking which recur 
throughout the Church’s history: casting off and reinstating,” adding that “the 
Church’s way, from the time of the Council of Jerusalem, has always been the 
way of Jesus, the way of mercy and reinstatement.”17 “Consequently,” the Pope 
continues, “there is a need to avoid judgements which do not take into account 
the complexity of various situations and to be attentive, by necessity, to how 
people experience distress because of their condition”18 (§296). 
Francis himself shows, by means of examples, how different such situations 
can be even in the case of divorce, and reminds pastors of the need of “adequately 
distinguishing” between them. Quoting Pope Benedict XVI, he insists that no 
“easy recipes” exist (§298). 
For this reason, he adds, “neither the Synod nor this Exhortation could be 
expected to provide a new set of general rules, canonical in nature and applicable 
to all cases.” And since “the degree of responsibility is not equal in all cases,”19 
“the consequences or effects of a rule need not necessarily always be the same” 
(§300). “A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in 
understanding its values, or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him 
to act differently and decide otherwise.” Mitigating factors may exist “which limit 
the ability to make a decision.”20 Francis quotes “Saint Thomas Aquinas himself ” 
as having “recognised that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be 
 16 The Synod of Bishops, Relatio Synodi: “The Pastoral Challenges of the Family in the 
Context of Evangelization,” 2014, 28, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/
rc_synod_doc_20141018_relatio-synodi-familia_en.html.
 17 Pope Francis’s Homily at Mass with the New Cardinals, 15 February 2005, Acta Apostolicae 
Sedis 107 (2015): 257.
 18 The Synod of Bishops, The Final Report: “The Vocation and Mission of the Family in the 
Church and in the Contemporary World,” 2015, 51, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20151026_relazione-finale-xiv-assemblea_en.html.
 19 Ibid.
 20 Ibid.
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able to exercise any one of the virtues well.”21 Even Saints, Thomas adds, may 
“experience difficulty” in practising what certain virtues require, “even though 
they have the habits of all the virtues”22 (§301).
Francis follows this up by quoting at length from the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church which again mentions these “mitigating factors,” claiming 
that “imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even 
nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, 
and other psychological or social factors.”23 For this reason, Francis continues, 
“a negative judgement about an objective situation does not imply a judgement 
about the imputability or culpability of the person involved.” And he quotes 
approvingly “what many Synod Fathers wanted to affirm,” namely, that “under 
certain circumstances people find it difficult to act differently. Therefore, while 
upholding a general rule, it is necessary to recognize that responsibility with 
respect to certain actions is not the same in all cases … Even the consequences of 
actions taken are not necessarily the same in all cases”24 (§302).
In the next paragraph the Exhortation talks about conscience. Aquinas 
called the habitual knowledge of the primary moral principles synderesis and 
the act of applying moral principles to particular actions conscientia.25 John 
Finnis explains: “One’s conscience [for Aquinas] is the judgement (sententia) 
one reaches in trying to apply practical principles … to particular (types) of 
situations in which one is deliberating about, or at least contemplating, acting, or 
is reflecting on what one did.”26 Conscience may be erroneous, whether through 
our own fault or through some cause for which we are not responsible.27 An 
erroneous conscience is morally binding simply because to the person in error 
it seems to be stating the truth, and so (however monstrous my error) I cannot 
defect from my conscience without being guilty of a willingness to act “contrary 
to the truth.”28 If our conscience tells us that we ought to perform a particular 
act, it is our moral duty to perform it.29 “Every conscience,” Aquinas insists, 
“whether it is right or wrong, whether it concerns things evil in themselves or 
 21 STh I-II 65.3 ad 2; Thomas Aquinas, De Malo, 2, art. 2.
 22 STh I-II 65.3 ad 2.
 23 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1735, 2352.
 24 The Synod of Bishops, The Final Report, 85.
 25 STh I 79.12-13. See Frederick Copleston, Aquinas (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 228, 
n.1.
 26 Finnis, Aquinas, 123, n. 101.
 27 Copleston, Aquinas, 228.
 28 STh I-II 19; Finnis, Aquinas, 123.
 29 Copleston, Aquinas, 228.
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things morally indifferent, obliges us to act in such a way that he who acts against 
his conscience sins.”30 As Copleston makes clear, “this does not mean that there 
is no such thing as an objectively correct moral conscience, but ignorance and 
mistakes are possible in moral matters, and the nearer we come to particulars the 
greater is the field for error.”31
The Exhortation therefore states that “while every effort should be made to 
encourage the development of an enlightened conscience,” there may be cases 
where, while recognising “that a given situation does not correspond objectively 
to the overall demands of the Gospel,” one may also at the same time recognize 
“with sincerity and honesty” that “it is what God himself is asking amid the 
concrete complexity of one’s limits” (§303). 
Following these considerations, Francis asserts that “it is reductive simply 
to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond to a general law 
or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God 
in the concrete life of a human being” (§304). The tone he uses at this point 
indicates how strongly Francis supports Thomas on this matter. “I earnestly 
ask,” he writes, “that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and 
learn to incorporate it in our potential discernment.” And he goes on to quote 
a well-known passage from the Summa Theologiae which makes the point that 
“although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to 
matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects,” and that “in matters 
of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of 
detail, but only as to the general principles; and when there is the same rectitude 
in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all. The principle will be found to 
fail, according as we descend further into detail.”32 Francis develops the argument 
further. “It is true,” he writes that:
General rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but 
in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all practical situations. 
At the same time it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a 
practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level 
of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger 
the very values which must be preserved with special care (§304).
In a footnote on the same page, Francis draws attention to the text in which, 
“referring to the general knowledge of the rule and the particular knowledge of 
 30 Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibetum, III.27.2.
 31 Copleston, Aquinas, 228.
 32 STh I-II 94.4.
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practical discernment, Saint Thomas states that if only one of the two is present, 
it is preferable that it is the knowledge of the particular reality, which is closer to 
the act.”33 “For this reason,” the Exhortation continues, “a pastor cannot feel that 
it is enough simply to apply moral laws to those living in ‘irregular’ situations, as if 
they were stones to throw at people’s lives.” In the same spirit, the Pope expresses 
full agreement with the International Theological Commission’s remark that 
“natural law could not be presented as an already established set of rules that 
impose themselves a priori on the moral subject; rather, it is a source of objective 
inspiration for the deeply personal process of making decisions”34 (§305).
What the Pope’s Exhortation shows, especially in Chapter Eight, is that 
there can be no proper moral assessment of human actions without an adequate 
understanding of human psychology. Francis finds in Thomas Aquinas the kind 
of philosophical/ psychological theory that can fill that role and satisfy that 
condition. For on Aquinas’ account, as one leading scholar has described it, a 
person:
Wills only what the intellect presents at that time as good under some description. 
Acts of will, then, are for something apprehended or cognised as good at a 
particular time and in particular circumstances, as distinct from something which 
is good considered unconditionally or abstractly. Besides happiness and the 
vision of God, all other things are such that they can in principle be considered 
good under some descriptions and not good under others, so that there is nothing 
about them which must constrain the will of any agent always to want them.35
This may give rise to situations where the intellect “influenced by the will, 
may be moved by opposed desires to represent the thing in question as both 
good (under one description) and not good (under a different description).”36 
Conversely, “the intellect need not present one simple, unified result to the 
will.”37 Furthermore, as we have seen, “the influence of the passions may also 
complicate the case.”38
 33 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum, VI, 6. 
 34 International Theological Commission, “In Search of a Universal Ethic. A New Look 
at Natural Law,” (2009), 59, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/
cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20090520_legge-naturale_en.html. The need to exercise 
humane reasonableness (epieikeia) as a corrective to the inadequacies of law is discussed by 
Aristotle in his examination of (particular) justice in Nicomachean Ethics V (1137a31-1138a3).
 35 Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will,” The Monist 80/4 
(2002): 580.
 36 Ibid., 582.
 37 Ibid.
 38 Ibid.
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Conclusion
Amoris Laetitia is full of references to Aquinas and is strongly influenced by 
his thought. The central philosophical argument that in morality there is a need 
to avoid judgements which do not take into account the complexity of problems 
and situations derives directly from him. So does the view that when things go 
wrong, the degree of responsibility is not equal in all cases, and that a negative 
judgement about an objective situation does not imply a judgement about the 
person involved; for as Aquinas shows, although one may be clear about general 
principles, the more one descends to matters of detail, the more frequently one 
encounters difficulties in determining what one should do. The Exhortation’s 
reflections on conscience, the virtues, marital love, and the upbringing of 
children owe a lot to Aquinas’ teachings, and it is for this reason that Francis 
invites his readers, especially those engaged in pastoral work, to be inspired by 
those teachings and to incorporate them in their approach. Amoris Laetitia can 
do this because, as John Finnis observes, “the natural soundness of Aquinas’ 
theorizing, its explanatory power, and detachment from the conditions of his 
own time, and even his own life, contributes greatly to its lasting worth.”39
Joe Friggieri
Faculty of Arts
University of Malta
Msida MSD 2080
Malta
joe.friggieri@um.edu.mt
 39 Finnis, Aquinas, 14.
